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Effec t s  of Varying Tax Receipts When t h e  Timing 
of Tax Payments is Indeterminate: The Case of 
A Tax on Corporate Dis t r ibu t ions  
David F. Bradford* 
1. In t roduct ion .  
This paper concerns an aspect  of t h e  quest ion:  When do govern- 
ment d e f i c i t s  mat ter?  My o r i g i n a l  i n t e n t  w a s  t o  sketch  out  as a 
s t a r t i n g  point  t h e  extension of previous work (1981) showing how 
endogenously generated d e f i c i t s  might have no real e f f e c t ,  a result 
obtained under an assumption of p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  between 
government and p r i v a t e  debt ,  t o  a world of r i s k y  debt  where t h e  latter 
assumption would no longer hold. l f y  i n t u i t i o n  w a s  t h a t  t h e  extension 
would go through in a s t ra ight forward  way. A s  it t u r n s  ou t ,  t h e  exten- 
s i o n  is not  q u i t e  a s  d i r e c t  as I had expected, and I th ink  t h e  d i f -  
f erence may be of some general  interest. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  condi- 
t i o n s  f o r  n e u t r a l i t y  seem less l i k e l y  t o  be f u l f i l l e d  in a p r a c t i c a l  
context .  
The underlying idea  i s  t h a t  it should not  matter when taxes  are 
paid, provided t h e r e  i s  an appropr ia te  compensating interest element 
in t h e  postponed l i a b i l i t y .  This not ion  c o n f l i c t s  with t h e  assump- 
t i o n  o f t e n  employed t h a t  it is t h e  gwerrrment's cash flow balance 
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t h a t  counts, w e n  though cur ren t  d e f i c i t s  may be o f f s e t  by corres- 
pondingly l a r g e r  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  f u t u r e  tax payments, and surpluses 
may r e f l e c t  drawing down l i a b i l i t i e s  f o r  f u t u r e  taxes. This i s s u e  
a r i s e s  expecia l ly  s t rong ly  in t h e  context  of ana lys i s  of proposals 
f o r  consumption-type taxes ,  where t h e r e  is a choice between a l i t e r a l  
consumption t a x  and a t a x  on wage and t r a n s f e r  r ece ip t s .  Typically 
t h e  two approaches generate the  same l i a b i l i t i e s  in a present  value 
sense, but  very  d i f f e r e n t  cash flows. 
The s p e c i f i c  case  I analyze involves a t a x  on d i s t r i b u t i o n s  by 
corporat ions t o  equi ty  holders,  in essence, a dividend tax. I f  such 
a tax is assessed a t  a f l a t  r a t e  which i s  not  expected t o  change, 
and if negat ive  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  ( s a l e s  of new equity)  a r e  included 
( i . e . ,  subs idized) ,  t h e  case is q u i t e  compelling in a p a r t i a l  equi- 
l ibr ium s e t t i n g ,  t h a t  the  l e v e l  of the  t a x  should have no inf luence  on 
real o r  f i n a n c i a l  t r ansac t ions  of a corporat ion ac t ing  in t h e  interest 
of i t s  stockholders. The reason i s  simply t h a t  t h e  f l a t  t a x  changes 
proport ionately t h e  consequences of a l l  decis ions  a s  f a r  as stockholder 
outcomes are concerned. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  trade-off in af te r - t ax  
d o l l a r s  f o r  t h e  shareholders between a l a r g e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  today and 
t h e  consequently smaller  d i s t r i b u t i o n  at  some f u t u r e  time is unaffected 
by the  rate of tax. 
In t h e  absence of all taxes  (and t ransact ions  cos ts )  t h e  various 
vers ions  of t h e  Modigliani-Miller (1958) Theorem t e l l  us t h e  corporation. 
w i l l  be i n d i f f e r e n t  between debt and equi ty  finance. An implicat ion is 
t h a t  t h e  timing of dividend payments i s  a matter of indi f ference .  
Since, a s  I have j u s t  argued informally, a f l a t  t a x  on dividends has 
no e f f e c t  on the  optimal f i n a n c i a l  policy,  something l i k e  t h e  
Modigliani-Miller Theorem should continue t o  hold. Hence, govern- 
ment r e c e i p t s  from such a tax will be determined by t h e  whims of 
corporate managers and needfo lLmno p a r t i c u l a r  path  as f a r  as 
wealth-maximizing ca lcu la t ions  a r e  involved. Will f l u c t u a t i o n s  in 
t a x  r e c e i p t s ,  a s  might a r i s e  in such an economy, have real e f f e c t s ?  
I n  Bradford (1981) I spe l l ed  out  an overlapping-generation 
model in which government debt  does genera l ly  inf luence  the  r a t i o n a l  
expectat ions equil ibrium path,  but  in which v a r i a t i o n s  in government 
debt a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  v a r i a t i o n s  in d i s t r i b u t i o n  t a x  r e c e i p t s  do not  
matter. The ind i f fe rence  about f i n a n c i a l  pol icy  a t  t h e  level of 
t h e  f irm, in s p i t e  of t h e  tax on d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  carries over t o  
n e u t r a l i t y  of t h e  economy's path  t o  the  choice of f i n a n c i a l  pol icy ,  
even though t h e  flow of tax r e c e i p t s  is af fec ted .  
The b a s i s  f o r  this conclusion is f a i r l y  simple: The c a p i t a l  
investment level chosen by t h e  f i r m  is governed by t h e  going i n t e r e s t  
rate. Therefore, a decis ion t o  i s s u e  an extra d o l l a r  of debt implies 
a decis ion t o  d i s t r i b u t e  an e x t r a  d o l l a r  t o  shareholders. This i n  
t u r n  Implies extra t a x  r e c e i p t s  of t d o l l a r s  (where t is t h e  r a t e  
of t ax ) .  I f  real government spending is f ixed,  t h e  e x t r a  t d o l l a r s  
a r e  devoted t o  reducing t h e  publ ic  debt.  The result thus  f a r  is a 
n e t  add i t ion  of 1-t d o l l a r s  t o  t h e  supply of f i n a n c i a l  assets. 
There remains, however, t h e  equity interest in t h e  corporat ion,  t h e  
value  of which is predicted t o  f a l l ,  n o t  by one d o l l a r ,  as a result 
of t h e  e x t r a  debt cum d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  but by 1-t d o l l a r s ,  in reflec- 
t i o n  of the  government's claim t o  a f r a c t i o n  t of all cash flows 
t o  shareholders. As a consequence, a l l  markets continue t o  c l e a r .  
The f i rm ' s  decis ion has no real e f f e c t ,  even though tax r e c e i p t s  are 
increased. 
The ana lys i s  j u s t  sketched su f f i ced  t o  demonstrate the  point  
t h a t  a t a x  on corporat ion d i s t r i b u t i o n s  may not  have t h e  often-assumed 
incent ive  e f f e c t s  with respect  t o  real and f i n a n c i a l  a l loca t ions .  
The n e u t r a l i t y  of t h e  t a x  as f a r  as t h e  aggregate economy is concerned 
was something of a by-product, necessary f o r  t h e  rkgorous v a l i d i t y  
of t h e  f i r m - l w e l  proposit ion,  but  not  t h e  main point .  I n  t h e  present  
inves t iga t ion  t h e  emphasis i s  reversed,  in t h a t  I am pr inc ipa l ly  con- 
cerned with how t h e  government cash-flow n e u t r a l i t y  result is af fec ted  
if t h e  pe r fec t  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  among f i n a n c i a l  assets, used in t h e  
argument above and a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  assumption of c e r t a i n t y ,  i s  
replaced i n  t h e  context of an e x p l i c i t  t reatment of uncer ta in ty .  Here 
the  indeterminacy of t h e  f i r m ' s  f i n a n c i a l  policy is needed t o  allow 
governnent r e c e i p t s  t o  vary.  
As it t u r n s  out ,  t h e  earlier results carry  over without s i g n i f i -  
can t  complication when o n l y  equi ty  is  r i s k y  while government and 
corporate debt are r i s k  f r e e ,  and the re fo re  pe r fec t  s u b s t i t u t e s .  
When, however, both government and corporate debt  are r i s k y ,  t h e  
n e u t r a l i t y  conclusions requ i re  two r e s t r i c t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  the  r i s k  
p roper t i e s  of gwernment debt must  be pre-specified. Second, the  
gwernment must be conmcitted t o  maintaining a p o r t f o l i o  of corporate 
bonds amounting t o  a f r e m  t of t h e  t o t a l  supply. While t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  requirements of implementing t h e  f i r s t  r e s t r i c t i o n  .do 
not  seem p a r t i c u l a r l y  demanding, t h e  second r e s t r i c t i o n  would 
involve a major change i n  government f i n a n c i a l  behavior. 
I n  sec t ion  2 below I review t h e  c e r t a i n t y  results a s  a way of 
introducing the  bas ic  model. The extension t o  a model with uncer- 
t a i n t y  is presented in Section 3. 
2. R w i e w  of the  Cer ta in ty  Model. 
The model underlying t h e  ana lys i s  i s  i n  t h e  Samuelson (1959) 
consumption loan t r a d i t i o n .  Individuals  l i v e  f o r  two periods in an 
in f in i t e  tlme horizon world. I n  the  f i r s t  l i fe-per iod each individual  
works (o f fe r ing  one unit  of labor  i n e l a s t i c a l l y ) ,  consumes, and saves 
f o r  ret irement.  "Retirement" descr ibes  t h e  second l i f  e-period, when 
each individual  d issaves  and consumes, leaving nothing t o  h i s  h e i r s .  
A l l  production takes  place in t h e  consolidated corporate sec tor  
which is modeled as a s i n g l e  price-taking firm. Production condit ions 
are described by a neoc lass ica l  production funct ion of c a p i t a l  and 
labor  employed, wi th  constant  r e tu rns  t o  scale. The c a p i t a l  ava i l ab le  
t o  t h e  corporat ion in any period is inher i t ed  from the previous period 
and is thus f ixed in amount before t h e  time of a c t u a l  production. The 
output  of a period may e i t h e r  be consumed or  frozen i n t o  i n f i n i t e l y  
durable c a p i t a l .  Investment is regarded as revers ib le .  
Savings may be held in th ree  forms, bonds i ssued by the  corpora- 
t i o n ,  shares  of i ts common stock,  o r  bonds issued by the  government. 
A given generat ion of individuals  acquires  these  f i n a n c i a l  assets a t  
the  end of i ts f i r s t  l i fe-per iod,  a f t e r  production f o r  t h a t  period 
has been completed, and a f t e r  t h e  investment and f i n a n c i a l  plans of 
the  corporat ion have been rea l i zed .  
The holders of its conrmon s tock "own" t h e  corporat ion.  The 
owners a t  t h e  beginning of a period con t ro l  t h a t  pe r iod ' s  production 
and t h e  r e a l  investment which determines t h e  amount of c a p i t a l  which 
w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  use  in production at  t h e  beginning of t h e  next  
period. The owners of t h e  f i rm at t h e  beginning of a period speci fy  
a s  w e l l  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  pol icy  f o r  t h a t  period,  which means they set 
t h e  amount of funds t o  be d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  themselves a s  dividends and 
t h e  amount of corporate borrowing. 
The government's real spending program i s  assumed f ixed ,  f o r  
s impl ic i ty  a t  a zero l e v e l .  The government is  thus modeled a s  a 
mechanical cash flow manager: in each period t h e  i n h e r i t e d  debt 
ob l iga t ion  must be  paid o f f ,  with any s h o r t f a l l  of tax r e c e i p t s  covered 
by t h e  i s s u e  of new debt .  
No t a t ion .  
To descr ibe  t h e  results of t h e  ana lys i s  formally, I use t h e  
follawing no ta t ion  (involving minor changes from t h a t  of t h e  1981 
paper t o  f a c i l i t a t e  extension t o  incorpora te  uncertainty):  
L: t o t a l  number of l abor  u n i t s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  applica- 
t i o n  during t h e  period (equals  t h e  number of 
individuals  born in t h e  period,  exogenously 
given) . 
K: s tock  of corporate c a p i t a l  a t  t h e  beginning of t h e  
period (used f o r  production during t h e  period).  
B: t o t a l  s tock  of corporate indebtedness a t  t h e  
beginning of t h e  period, which must be repaid 
during t h e  period. 
F(K,L): t he  production function,  characterized by constant 
r e tu rns  t o  scale. 
D: t o t a l  d i s t r i bu t i on  made by t h e  corporation during 
the  period. 
gg: t o t a l  s tock of government indebtedness a t  t he  
beginning of t h e  period,  which must be repaid 
during the  period. 
t: r a t e  of t ax  on corporate d i s t r i bu t i ons  t o  stock- 
holders. 
There are two ordinary p r ices  in the  model (current  output is 
nuneraire) ,  and one price-l ike "valuation function": 
w : wage. 
d: t h e  discotmt rate; a bond payable next period sells 
f o r  d in t h e  current  period. 
V(K+,B+): a funct ion r e l a t i n g  t he  "ex dividend" value of 
corporate equity,  t h a t  is, the  value at t he  end 
of a period,  a f t e r  production is complete, t o  
t h e  f inanc ia l  and investment decisions of the  
current  owners. 
For any var iab le ,  X, l e t  X+, X*, e t c . ,  represent  i ts  
value in succeeding periods; X - its value i n  t h e  preceding 
e period. Let X+ denote the  value of X expected t o  obta in  in 
t h e  next period. 
There are th ree  c lasses  of agents in t h e  model, two displaying 
1 2  
maximizing behavior. The "young" t r y  t o  maximize U(c ,c+) 
i ( labor  is  supplied i n e l a s t i c a l l y ) ,  where c is consumption during 
the  ith period of t h e  l i f e  cycle.  The "old" manage t h e  corporat ion 
2 t o  maximize c , which m e a n s  maximize (1-t) D+V(K+,B+) . The t h i r d  
agent is t h e  government which, as has been mentioned, a c t s  mechanicallly 
g in managing the  cash flow according t o  dB+ = B g - t ~ .  
Evolution of the  Economy. 
The s i t u a t i o n  inher i t ed  from the p a s t  is described by (K,B,B~,L)  ,
with L evolving exogenously along a known path. The requirements 
placed on t h e  model world are t h a t  t h e  evolution t o  (K+,B+,B: ,L+) 
be determined by c lea r ing  of competitive "spot" markets f o r  l abor ,  
corporate bonds, government bonds, corporate equi ty  and goods, and 
that the expectat ions on which demands and suppl ies  depend be "ra t ional ."  
The general  notion of r a t i o n a l  expecta t ions ,  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  Muth (1961), 
here  encompasses two proper t ies :  Expectations are cor rec t ,  and they 
are determinate, in t h e  sense that they a r e  governed by knowledge of 
t h e  economic s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  current  state of t h e  economy. For 
r a t i o n a l  expectat ions t o  make sense, the re  must be an appropr ia te  degree 
of determinacy of t h e  model as a whole, including i ts expectations- 
formation. Solvfng t h e  model Involves showing t h a t  t h e  endogenous 
va r iab les ,  including p r ices  and expectat ions,  can be expressed as 
s ta t ionary  functions of t h e  state var iab les ,  K, B,  and Bg, given 
t h e  known path of  L. Properly, the re  should a s w e l l  be a demonstration 
t h a t  the  proposed equil ibrium path is  at least l o c a l l y  unique-other- 
wise, why should t h e  economic agents pick t h e  required q e c t a t i o n s -  
forming r u l e ?  
In my previous work I described an equil ibrium path of the  
economy sketched out  above. ( I  d id  not  a c t u a l l y  demonstrate l o c a l  
uniqueness, although I th ink the  s o l u t i o n  is probably g lobal ly  
unique.) The n e u t r a l i t y  r e s u l t  concerning t h e  r a t e  of t a x  on corporate 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  followed from the  conclusion t h a t  t h e  equil ibrium 
valuat ion funct ion is  given by (1) . 
The ob jec t ive  of t h e  owners of t h e  f i rm is t o  set employment together  
with K+, B+ and D t o  nmxidze  (I-t)D + V(K+,B+) . I f  we sub- 
s t i t u t e  f o r  D i n  t h e  ob jec t ive  function,  using accounting re la t ion-  
sh ip  (2) among t h e  out lays  by t h e  f irm, B+ drops out .  
Maximizing values of the other  va r iab les  are independent of t ,  
while the f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  f i rm is indeterminate. 
Indeterminacy of f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  corresponds t o  indeter-  
minacy of government t a x  rece ip t s .  The reason t h e  equil ibrium path 
of t h e  economy's real var iab les  and p r ices  is nonetheless determinate 
is suggested by the  expression (3) of equa l i ty  between t h e  value of 
demanded and supplied claims t o  f u t u r e  consumption: 
2 
where c+(d,w) is t h e  retirement-period consumption (which w i l l  take  . 
place next period) demanded by a represen ta t ive  young person, where 
t h e  values of K+ and B+ have been set by t h e  current  owners of t h e  
e firm, and where I have taken f o r  granted w+ = w+. The expression 
on the  l e f t  is the  value of claims demanded on the  bas i s  of l i f e -  
cycle optimization by members of t h e  young generation. The f i r s t  two 
terms on the  r i g h t  are the  values of bonds supplied,  and the  t h i r d  is 
t h e  value of corporate equity. Exploiting t he  government's budget 
cons t ra in t ,  dB: = B g - t ~ ,  and the  already mentioned accounting rela- 
t ionship  (2) between D and t h e  o ther  var iables ,  allows us t o  wr i t e  
condit ion (3) as 
Once again, B+ has been eliminated, so  t h e  condit ion is independent 
of corporate f i nanc i a l  policy. 
Equation (5) expresses a f u r t he r  reformulation of the  same condit ion,  
taking advantage of Euler ' s  theorem (an open question: Can one dispense 
with linear homogeneity of F?) : 
The left-hand s i d e  of (5) is, as before,  t he  demand by the  young genera- 
t i o n  f o r  assets. The right-hand s i de ,  the  economy's ne t  supply of assets, 
is t h e  d i f ference between gwernment bonds ca r r i ed  over from the  pas t  
and t h e  tax r e ce ip t s  t h a t  would be generated if t h e  corporation were 
t o  be l iquidated in t h e  current  period. The l a s t  term, in other  words, 
a f f ec t s  t h e  real equil ibrium path like an an t ic ipa ted  t a x  r ece ip t  "asset" 
of the government, o f f s e t t i n g  e x p l i c i t  government debt. Through t h i s  
re la t ionsh ip  one obta ins  a clear sense of why d e f i c i t s  o r  surpluses due 
t o  v a r i a t i o n s  in corporate d i s t r i b u t i o n s  have no e f f e c t  on the  real 
path of t h e  economy, even though government debt does matter. An 
increase in d i s t r i b u t i o n s  simultaneously reduces government debt 
and the  p o t e n t i a l  tax r e c e i p t  asset by equal amounts. 
3. Introducing Uncertainty. 
There a r e  var ious  ways one might introduce uncer ta in ty  t o  t h i s  
model. I have chosen t o  make t h e  f u t u r e  production condit ions de- 
pendent upon t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  state ( f o r  example, weather condit ions)  
occurring. Spec i f i ca l ly ,  I assume t h a t  t h e  investment decis ion is 
f ixed  in t h e  current  period,  but  t h e  a c t u a l  production funct ion is 
determined i n  the  next period. 
Let  S s t and  f o r  the set of poss ib le  states t h a t  might obta in  
in the  c ~ l r e n t  period,  S+ the  set of poss ib le  states in t h e  next 
period,  and s o  on. The l a r g e r  dimensionality of t h e  problem requ i res  
some new notat ion.  The following describes my compromise between 
comprehensiveness and mnemonics. Ln general ,  va r i ab les  a r e  now 
understood t o  have a subscr ip t  t o  designate t h e  s t a t e  and t h e  with 
which they are associated.  Thus, w i&S+, r e f e r s  t o  t h e  wage rate i ' 
red l i zed  i n  state i next period. Since t h e  s t o r y  starts with a knowa 
current  s t a t e ,  we can let var iab les  with no subscr ip t  r e f e r  t o  t h e  
values cur ren t ly  rea l i zed .  
I s h a l l  a l s o  assume t h a t  S is f i n i t e  in each period,  and t h a t  
an ordering has been agreed upon f o r  the  states in each period,  so  
we can use the' subsc r ip t  "+" t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  vector  of values of a 
v a r i a b l e  obtaining in t h e  next  period. (I make an exception f o r  
==+ 
and I+, which keep t h e i r  previous scalar in te rp re ta t ion . )  Thus, 
e 
w r e f e r s  t o  the  vec to r  of wage r a t e s  present ly  an t i c ipa ted  f o r  next + ' 
period,  w i t h  components wi, i&S+, and has dimensionality equal t o  
t h e  number of states in S+. 
The f i rm and the  government must now speci fy ,  ins tead of t h e  
single-dimensional bonds, vectors  of s t a te - spec i f i c  claims, where, 
f o r  example, Bi, iES+, pays one u n i t  if state i is rea l i zed  next  
period, and zero  ff another state is  rea l i zed .  To i s s u e  a r i s k l e s s  
bond is equivalent  t o  s e l l i n g  one u n i t  each of claims Bi, iES+. 
Instead of t h e  s i n g l e  discount f a c t o r  d, we now have a vector  
of p r i c e s  of un i t  claims contingent  on the  next  per iod 's  state. I f  
e is the  vec to r  of ones of appropr ia te  dimension, e+-d is the  + 
p r i c e  of a riskless bond, Since w e  s h a l l  want t o  continue t o  use t h e  
ordinary subsc r ip t  t o  refer t o  t h e  state and time in which a par t icu-  
lar v a r i a b l e  is r e a l i z e d ,  f o r  example, di, iG+ is t h e  vec to r  of 
discount rates (appl icable  t o  claims on output  two periods 
hence) r ea l i zed  if s t a t e  i occurs next  period,  I s h a l l  use parentheses 
when I wish t o  i d e n t i f y  a p a r t i c u l a r  element of d. Thus, (d) i, i&S+, 
is a scalar, m e l y ,  the  present  p r i c e  of a claim t o  one unit i f  state 
i occurs next period. The 8-01 d+ r e f e r s  t o  the  natrir of dis -  
count f a c t o r  vec to r s ,  one f o r  each poss ib le  state t h a t  might be 
rea l i zed  next  period. 
We are now in a p o s i t i o n  t o  study the  analogues in t h e  world of 
r i s k  t o  t h e  temporary equil ibrium re la t ionsh ips  discussed earlier. 
We may guess, f o r  example, t h a t  t h e  valuat ion funct ion f o r  corporate 
equi ty  is given by (6).  
This is simply t h e  value  of t h e  vector  of payoffs, contingent on the  
state rea l i zed ,  tha t  t h e  purchaser of t h e  equi ty  expects  t o  ob ta in  
in t h e  form of d i s t r i b u t i o n  plus  proceeds from s a l e  of t h e  equi ty  
interest. 
To analyze asset market c l ea r ing  in t h i s  case,  i t  is not  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  look a t  t h e  aggregate value  of present  claims, as w e  did  above. We 
must now look f o r  t h e  state-by-state equa l i ty  of suppl ies  and demands of 
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contingent claims. Recall t h a t  c+(v,d) is now t o  be in te rp re ted  
a s  the vector  of consumption planned by the  represen ta t ive  young person 
f o r  t h e  retirement period,  contingent on t h e  state rea l i zed .  A s s e t  
market c l ea r ing  now requ i res  t h e  vector  equation (7)  
where, as before,  w e  a r e  taking f o r  granted t h e  determination of K+ 
and w+ via other  equil ibrium re la t ionsh ips ,  given w and d. I n  
t h e  c e r t a i n t y  case  we were a b l e  t o  use the  government budget r e la t ion-  
ship ,  d.B: = Bg - t D ,  together with t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between D and 
B+, t o  eliminate both B+ and B! from t h e  asset market c lear ing 
condition. Under uncer ta in ty ,  t h e  combination of these  two re la t ion-  
ships  is no longer s u f f i c i e n t .  Whereas before,  const ra in ing t h e  value 
of t h e  govermnent's bond sales o r  purchases determined t h e  quant i ty  
(given d) , t h e  government now may choose among various combinations 
of s tate-contingent  claims, ( i .e . ,  d e a l  in bonds of d i f f e r e n t  r i s k  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) .  Moreover, t h e  same can be sa id  of t h e  firm. Thus, 
i f  we t ake  as a s t a r t i n g  point  t h a t  the  government only i s s u e s  r i s k l e s s  
bonds (buys riskless bonds in t h e  case of negat ive  government deb t ) ,  
we have s t i l l  no t  pinned down temporary equil ibrium because t h e  r i s k  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  f i r m ' s  debt have not  been determined. Temporary 
equi l ibr ium the re fo re  depends on t h e  f i rm ' s  f i n a n c i a l  po l i cy ,  b u t ,  
s i n c e  t h e  f i rm is a price t a k e r ,  t h a t  pol icy  is s t i l l  a matter  of 
indi f ference .  The economy may apparently wander aimlessly.  
I f  both the  govermnent and t h e  corpora t ion  a r e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
riskless debt ,  t h e  argument goes through much a s  it d i d  in t he  r i sk -  
f r e e  analys is .  In tha t  case ,  extra bonds issued by the  corpora t ion  
generate not  only t h e  exact withdrawal in v&ue of government bonds 
(as  a consequence of e x t r a  taxes paid) required t o  maintain f i n a n c i a l  
market equil ibrium in view of t h e  associa ted  dec l ine  in t h e  value of 
corpora te  equi ty ,  but &so t h e  matching change in t h e  state-by-state 
contingent  claims. 
Neither assumption, r i sk-f ree  government bonds o r  r i sk - f ree  
corpora te  bonds is &together  a t t r a c t i v e .  In  a time of s t o c h a s t i c  
i n f l a t i o n  rates, government bonds are anything but  r i s k  f r e e .  More 
obviously, corpora te  bonds do carry d e f a u l t  r i s k .  
What is requi red  is a mechanism t o  a s su re  t h a t ,  in any period,  
tB+ + B: is independent of t h e  f i rm's  f i n a n c i a l  pol icy  and pre- 
determined as f a r  as government pol icy  is concerned. Here is one 
mechanism t o  b r ing  about t h e  des i red  result: Make it government 
pol icy  t o  purchase a f r a c t i o n  t of every corpora te  bond i s s u e ,  
while f i x i n g  i n  advance t h e  r i s k  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of government debt .  
I s h a l l  desc r ibe  t h i s  formally not  as the  purchase of corpora te  debt ,  
but as t h e  purchase ( i . e . ,  reduced supply) of t h e  equivalent  package 
of s t a t e - s p e c i f i c  claims on t h e  government. Taken l i t e r a l l y ,  such 
a pol icy  would change t h e  e x p l i c i t  r i s k  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of government 
debt.  Actual implementation, however, should be imagined a s  simul- 
taneous i s s u e  of e x t r a  government debt  and purchase of corpora te  
debt.  The e f f e c t  on t h e  government's p o r t f o l i o  of s t a t e - s p e c i f i c  
claims is t h e  same. 
The suggested pol icy  then is described by (8) 
where a is a pre-specif ied vec to r  with dimension equal  t o  the  s i z e  + 
of S+. (For example, a+ might equal  e+, i n  which case t h e  
government i s s u e s  riskless bonds.) 
Using t h e  accounting r e l a t i o n s h i p s  descr ib ing D , condi t ion  (8) 
impl ies  (a)  
providing t h e  des i red  independence of B: + tB+ from B+, while 
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i a s  of government debt  a r e  determined by a. 
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